De se attitudes: Ascription and communication

Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567 (2010)
Abstract
This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00290.x
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA
Semantics and the Objects of Assertion.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (5):355-380.
Mental Graphs.James Pryor - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):309-341.
First-Person Propositions.Peter W. Hanks - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):155-182.
Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):101-120.
Centered Communication.Clas Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):205-223.

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