Against Moral Hedging

Economics and Philosophy (3):1-21 (2015)
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Abstract

It has been argued by several philosophers that a morally motivated rational agent who has to make decisions under conditions of moral uncertainty ought to maximize expected moral value in his choices, where the expectation is calculated relative to the agent's moral uncertainty. I present a counter-example to this thesis and to a larger family of decision rules for choice under conditions of moral uncertainty. Based on this counter-example, I argue against the thesis and suggest a reason for its failure – that it is based on the false assumption that inter-theoretical comparisons of moral value are meaningful.

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Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

Discounting for public policy: A survey.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):391-439.
Decision under normative uncertainty.Franz Dietrich & Brian Jabarian - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (3):372-394.
Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal.Christian Tarsney - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):324-344.
An axiomatic approach to axiological uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):483-504.

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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
What to do when you don’t know what to do.Andrew Sepielli - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.
Desire as belief.David Lewis - 1988 - Mind 97 (418):323-32.
The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.

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