Reasoning with comparative moral judgements: an argument for Moral Bayesianism

In Rafal Urbaniak & Gillman Payette (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy - The Road Less Travelled. Cham: Springer. pp. 113-136 (2017)
Authors
Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.
Keywords moral uncertainty  Bayesian conditionalization  Jeffrey's conditionalization
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