Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty: a trilemma
Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2853-2871 (2020)
Abstract
I discuss the trilemma that consists of the following three principles being inconsistent: 1. The Common Principle: if one distribution, A, necessarily brings a higher total sum of personal value that is distributed in a more egalitarian way than another distribution, B, A is more valuable than B. 2. (Weak) ex-ante Pareto: if one uncertain distribution, A, is more valuable than another uncertain distribution, B, for each patient, A is more valuable than B. 3. Pluralism about attitudes to risk (Pluralism): the personal value of a prospect is a weighted sum of the values of the prospect’s outcomes, but the weight each outcome gets might be different from the probability the prospect assigns to the outcome.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-020-01587-9
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Citations of this work
A Defense of Pluralist Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty: Axiomatic Characterization.Akira Inoue & Kaname Miyagishima - 2022 - Wiley: Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (3):370-394.
Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes.Haim Cohen, Anat Maril, Sun Bleicher & Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2553-2577.
References found in this work
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
