Cultura 11 (1):127-140 (2014)

Authors
Adrian Nita
University of Craiova
Abstract
Leibniz sustains three arguments for spontaneity: the argument from the complete notion, the argument from substantial forms and the argument from monadicspontaneity. In order to see the nature of spontaneity and whether the spontaneity is an inferior value with respect to freedom, as it appears in the Theodicy, inthe first part of the paper I will present spontaneity in connection with the theory of complete notion; in the second part, spontaneity and substantial forms; in the third part, spontaneity of monads; then I will finish with a more general view about spontaneity and freedom
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DOI 10.5840/cultura20141118
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