Review of Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy [Book Review]

Abstract
Reviews the book, Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter and C. Klohr . In this book, Henrik Walter applies the methodology of neurophilosophy to one of philosophy’s central challenges and enduring questions: the notion of free will. The author argues that free will is an illusion if we mean by it that under identical conditions we would be able to do or decide otherwise, while simultaneously acting only for reasons and being the true originators of our actions. In place of this problematic version of free will, Walter offers what he calls “natural autonomy,” that is, self-determination unaided by supernatural powers that could exist even in an entirely determined universe. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1037/h0091395
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,248
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Neurophilosophy of Free Will.Henrik Walter - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Metaphysical Illusions.J. J. C. Smart - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):167 – 175.
The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
Added to PP index
2010-08-24

Total downloads
19 ( #265,357 of 2,192,221 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #289,802 of 2,192,221 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature