A Resource‐Rational, Process‐Level Account of the St. Petersburg Paradox

&
Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (1):417-432 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How much would you pay to play a lottery with an “infinite expected payoff?” In the case of the century old, St. Petersburg Paradox, the answer is that the vast majority of people would only pay a small amount. The authors seek to understand this paradox by providing an explanation consistent with a broad, process‐level model of human decision‐making under risk.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/tops.12486

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Time, bounded utility, and the St. Petersburg paradox.Tyler Cowen & Jack High - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (3):219-223.
A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling.Marc Le Menestrel - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (3):249-262.
On the normative dimension of the St. Petersburg paradox.David Teira - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):210-223.
Rational Choice and Expected Utility.Reed Brannon Richter - 1985 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
The St. Petersburg gamble and risk.Paul Weirich - 1984 - Theory and Decision 17 (2):193-202.
The Limits of Rationality.Patrick Suppes - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1):85-101.
The Limits of Rationality.Patrick Suppes - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1):85-101.
Revealed Preference and Expected Utility.Stephen A. Clark - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
A conditional expected utility model for myopic decision makers.Leigh Tesfatsion - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (2):185-206.
Subjective expected utility theory revisited: A reductio ad absurdum paradox.Paul J. H. Schoemaker - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (1):1-21.
Paradox Lost, but in which Envelope?Olav Gjelsvik - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):353-362.
Consequentialism and rational choice: Lessons from the Allais paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
The St. Petersburg Puzzle.Samuel Gorovitz - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 259--270.
Expected Comparative Utility Theory: A New Theory of Rational Choice.David Robert - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):19-37.
Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-04

Downloads
9 (#1,224,450)

6 months
4 (#790,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

View all 12 references / Add more references