An argument for metaphysical realism

Abstract
This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve. But the interpretation of its premises introduces subtleties: whether, for example, these premises are to be understood as assertions about the world or about our evidence, internally or externally, via assertibility conditions or truth conditions – and what sorts of beings are included in the `we' upon whose cognitions the antirealist supposes the structure of the world to depend. I argue that antirealism can provide no defensible, fully articulated interpretation of the premises that either shows them not to be true or defeats the reasoning.
Keywords antirealism  metaphysics  realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035149.31235.79
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,208
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Moral Realism.Michael Devitt - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-15.
The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism.G. H. Merrill - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81.
The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.
Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction.Jürgen Dümont - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Priest and the Bishop.Sven Rosenkranz - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):335–347.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

66 ( #78,965 of 2,164,292 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #62,436 of 2,164,292 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums