Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737 (2019)

Authors
Kate Nolfi
University of Vermont
Abstract
An action-oriented epistemology takes the idea that our capacity for belief subserves our capacity for action as the starting point for epistemological theorizing. This paper argues that an action-oriented epistemology is especially well-positioned to explain why it is that, at least for believers like us, whether or not conforming with the epistemic norms that govern belief-regulation would lead us to believe that p always bears on whether we have normative reasons to believe that p. If the arguments of this paper are successful, then an action-oriented approach has a kind of explanatory power that has proved elusive, and so merits serious and sustained philosophical attention that it has yet to receive.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02485-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.
Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

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