Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204 (2015)

Authors
Kate Nolfi
University of Vermont
Abstract
According to the normativist, it is built into the nature of belief itself that beliefs are subject to a certain set of norms. I argue here that only a normativist account can explain certain non-normative facts about what it takes to have the capacity for belief. But this way of defending normativism places an explanatory burden on any normativist account that an account on which a truth norm is explanatorily fundamental simply cannot discharge. I develop an alternative account that can achieve explanatory adequacy where this sort of truth privileging account falls short
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12071
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References found in this work BETA

Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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