Non-Factivity About Knowledge: A Defensive Move

The Reasoner 2 (11):6-7 (2008)
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Abstract

Those defending non-factivity of knowledge should explain why it is so intuitive that knowledge entails truth. One option they have is to concede a great deal to this intuition: they can maintain that we know that knowledge is factive, even though it is not.

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Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame

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