In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy

Metaphysica 14 (2):239-252 (2013)
Authors
Harold Noonan
Nottingham University
Abstract
Can the world itself be vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ :208, 1978). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in truth value, to which this conception of ‘worldly’ vagueness is opposed, calling it the ‘sensible’ theory of indeterminacy and rejecting it. In what follows, I defend the sensible theory van Inwagen rejects. I first explain more fully what it involves and, as importantly, what it does not.
Keywords Vagueness  Indeterminacy  Identity  Existence
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-013-0124-3
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References found in this work BETA

Many, but Almost One.David Lewis - 1993 - In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-38.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Can There Be Vague Objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Many Many Problems.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):481–501.

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