Moderate monism, persistence and sortal concepts

Abstract

Coincidence comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.

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Harold Noonan
Nottingham University

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
How things persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Contingent identity.Allan Gibbard - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.

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