Modal realism, still at your convenience
Analysis 77 (2):299-303 (2017)
| Abstract |
Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories |
No categories specified (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1093/analys/anx037 |
| Options |
Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
|
Download optionsOur Archive
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 31,812
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- academic.oup.com
(no proxy) - eprints.nottingham.ac.uk (no proxy)
- eprints.nottingham.ac.uk [2] (no proxy)
- academic.oup.com [2] (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articlesAgainst Lewisian Modal Realism From a Metaontological Point of View.Koyama Tora - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1207-1225.
Theistic Modal Realism I: The Challenge of Theistic Actualism.Michael Almeida - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12419.
Impossibilia and Modally Tensed Predication.Takashi Yagisawa - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):317-323.
Realizm modalny i okresy warunkowe z niemożliwymi poprzednikami [Modal Realism and Counterpossibles].Maciej Sendłak - 2014 - Filozofia Nauki 22 (4).
The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties.Harold Noonan & Mark Jago - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):134-140.
Added to PP index
2017-09-12
Total downloads
12 ( #427,350 of 2,231,535 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #80,346 of 2,231,535 )
2017-09-12
Total downloads
12 ( #427,350 of 2,231,535 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #80,346 of 2,231,535 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
My notes
