Modal realism, still at your convenience

Analysis 77 (2):299-303 (2017)
Abstract
Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx037
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References found in this work BETA
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
An Inconvenient Modal Truth.John Divers - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):575-577.

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