Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71 (2015)

Harold Noonan
Nottingham University
Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis
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DOI 10.1111/phin.12076
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Reference and Generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Identity.Harold Noonan & Benjamin L. Curtis - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relative Identity.Harry Deutsch - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Many as One.Thomas Sattig - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:145-178.
Logics of Relative Identity.Paweł Garbacz - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (1):27-50.

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