Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):134-140 (2012)

Mark Jago
Nottingham University
According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan's proposed counterexamples. As we show, she does not need to amend her analysis of possibility statements, or her theory of what properties are
Keywords properties  David Lewis  possibilia  modal realism  counterparts  accidental properties
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.17
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.Andy Egan - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.F. Jackson & G. Priest - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48.

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