Ratio 29 (3):268-282 (2016)

Robert Northcott
Birkbeck, University of London
I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree of uncertainty about relevant probability estimates; and the exact sequence in which we integrate DA and empirical concerns. I conclude that only given a particular configuration of these factors might DA still be of interest.
Keywords Doomsday  miracles  trumping  probability
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DOI 10.1111/rati.12104
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