A material dissolution of the problem of induction

Synthese 191 (4):1-20 (2014)
Abstract
In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. Attempts to recreate the problem in the material theory of induction fail. They require relations of inductive support to conform to an unsustainable, hierarchical empiricism
Keywords Problem of induction  Material theory of induction  Infinite regress
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0356-3
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References found in this work BETA
A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
The Foundations of Scientific Inference.Wesley C. Salmon - 1966 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.

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Citations of this work BETA
Turning Norton’s Dome Against Material Induction.Richard Dawid - 2015 - Foundations of Physics 45 (9):1101-1109.

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