A new approach to the relational‐substantival debate

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11:3-43 (2018)
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Abstract

We should see the debate over the existence of spacetime as a debate about the fundamentality of spatiotemporal structure to the physical world. This is a non-traditional conception of the debate, which captures the spirit of the traditional one. At the same time, it clarifies the point of contention between opposing views and offsets worries that the dispute is stagnant or non-substantive. It also unearths a novel argument for substantivalism, given current physics. Even so, that conclusion can be overridden by future physics. I conclude that this debate is a substantive one, which the substantivalist is currently winning.

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Jill North
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

How to Be a Spacetime Substantivalist.Trevor Teitel - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (5):233-278.
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Theory (In-)Equivalence and conventionalism in f(R) gravity.Patrick M. Duerr - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (C):10-29.

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