Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):380–403 (1997)

Authors
Alastair Norcross
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
It is sometimes claimed that a consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism has problems accommodating the importance of personal commitments to other people. However, by emphasizing the distinction between criteria of rightness and decision procedures, a consequentialist can allow for non-consequentialist decision procedures, such as acting directly on the promptings of natural affection. Furthermore, such non-consequentialist motivational structures can co-exist happily with a commitment to consequentialism. It is possible to be a self-reflective consequentialist who has genuine commitments to individuals and to moral principles, without engaging in self-deception.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00045
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,118
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.
Cricket and Moral Commendation.Jonathan Evans - 2007 - Sport and Society 10 (5):802-817.
When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley?Scott Woodcock - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):299-316.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Consequentialize This.Campbell Brown - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):749-771.
Consequentialism and Decision Procedures.Toby Ord - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
A Consequentialist Case for Rejecting the Right.Frances Howard-Snyder & Alastair Norcross - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:109-125.
Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?Elinor Mason - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):243-261.
Moral Commitment and Moral Theory.Sarah Stroud - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:381-398.
Good and Bad Actions.Alastair Norcross - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (1):1-34.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
81 ( #112,877 of 2,324,595 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #461,830 of 2,324,595 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes