Causation as folk science

In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Philosophers' Imprint. Oxford University Press (2007)
Abstract
I deny that the world is fundamentally causal, deriving the skepticism on non-Humean grounds from our enduring failures to find a contingent, universal principle of causality that holds true of our science. I explain the prevalence and fertility of causal notions in science by arguing that a causal character for many sciences can be recovered, when they are restricted to appropriately hospitable domains. There they conform to a loose collection of causal notions that form a folk science of causation. This recovery of causation exploits the same generative power of reduction relations that allows us to recover gravity as a force from Einstein's general relativity and heat as a conserved fluid, the caloric, from modern thermal physics, when each theory is restricted to appropriate domains. Causes are real in science to the same degree as caloric and gravitational forces.
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Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument.Markus Eronen - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.
No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Physics.Mathias Frisch - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):313-336.
Getting Rid of Interventions.Alexander Reutlinger - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):787-795.
What Counts as a Newtonian System? The View From Norton's Dome.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):275-297.

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