Philosophy of Science 77 (4):501-523 (2010)
Bayesian probabilistic explication of inductive inference conflates neutrality of supporting evidence for some hypothesis H (“not supporting H”) with disfavoring evidence (“supporting not-H”). This expressive inadequacy leads to spurious results that are artifacts of a poor choice of inductive logic. I illustrate how such artifacts have arisen in simple inductive inferences in cosmology. In the inductive disjunctive fallacy, neutral support for many possibilities is spuriously converted into strong support for their disjunction. The Bayesian “doomsday argument” is shown to rely entirely on a similar artifact, for the result disappears in a reanalysis that employs fragments of inductive logic able to represent evidential neutrality. Finally, the mere supposition of a multiverse is not yet enough to warrant the introduction of probabilities without some factual analog of a randomizer over the multiverses.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?By Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243–255.
Disbelief as the Dual of Belief.John D. Norton - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):231 – 252.
Citations of this work BETA
Waiting for Landauer.John D. Norton - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 42 (3):184-198.
Predictability Crisis in Early Universe Cosmology.Chris Smeenk - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (1):122-133.
What Counts as Scientific Data? A Relational Framework.Sabina Leonelli - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):810-821.
History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein's Quanta, Mercury's Perihelion. [REVIEW]John D. Norton - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):3-27.
Similar books and articles
Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic, or Mere Inductive Framework?Michael Strevens - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379.
'Self-Supporting' Inductive Arguments.Nelson Pole - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:496 - 503.
On the Puzzle of Self-Supporting Inductive Arguments.Asa Kasher - 1972 - Mind 81 (322):277-279.
Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence.Steven Gimbel - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
Giving Up Judgment Empiricism: The Bayesian Epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Grover Maxwell.James Hawthorne - 1989 - In C. Wade Savage & C. Anthony Anderson (eds.), ReReading Russell: Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology; Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 12. University of Minnesota Press.
Self-Supporting Arguments.Andrew D. Cling - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279–303.
The Circularity of a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument.Peter Achinstein - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):138 - 141.
From Observability to Manipulability: Extending the Inductive Arguments for Realism.Rom Harré - 1996 - Synthese 108 (2):137 - 155.
Added to index2009-10-15
Total downloads75 ( #69,837 of 2,168,922 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #187,136 of 2,168,922 )
How can I increase my downloads?