Synthese 198 (1):395-418 (2018)

Authors
James Norton
University of Iceland
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
Michael J. Duncan
University of Sydney
Abstract
This paper defends Flatland—the view that there exist neither determination nor dependence relations, and that everything is therefore fundamental—from the objection from explanatory inefficacy. According to that objection, Flatland is unattractive because it is unable to explain either the appearance as of there being determination relations, or the appearance as of there being dependence relations. We show how the Flatlander can meet the first challenge by offering four strategies—reducing, eliminating, untangling and omnizing—which, jointly, explain the appearance as of determination relations where no such relations obtain. Since, plausibly, dependence relations just are asymmetric determination relations, we argue that once we come mistakenly to believe that there exist determination relations, the existence of other asymmetries explains why it appears that there are dependence relations.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02023-6
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
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Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
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On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.

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Social Kinds Are Essentially Mind-Dependent.Rebecca Mason - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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