Davidson on social externalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94 (2005)
Abstract
A central premise in Tyler Burge's argument for social externalism says that an incomplete understanding can be sufficient for concept possession. Burge claims that this premise is grounded in ordinary practices of giving psychological explanations. On the basis of an extended version of Burge's 'arthritis' case Donald Davidson has argued that this claim is false. The paper argues that Davidson's argument is unconvincing. A closer analysis of Davidson's extended 'arthritis' case shows that the belief ascriptions Davidson focuses on actually support social externalism
Keywords Concept  Epistemology  Externalism  Social  Burge, T  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00216.x
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References found in this work BETA
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Belief de Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.
Other Bodies.Tyler Burge - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.

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