Free will is not a testable hypothesis

Erkenntnis:1-15 (forthcoming)
Abstract
Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a posteriori consideration of the relevant neuroscientific investigations, as well as on standard philosophy of science work on the notion of testability.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9974-y
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References found in this work BETA
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 14 (41):87-93.
Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility.Adina L. Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.

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