In Kathryn Plaisance & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Philosophy of Behavioral Biology. Springer. pp. 65-82 (2012)

Authors
Robert Northcott
Birkbeck, University of London
Abstract
I use a contrastive theory of causal explanation to analyze the notion of a genetic trait. The resulting definition is relational, an implication of which is that no trait is genetic always and everywhere. Rather, every trait may be either genetic or non-genetic, depending on explanatory context. I also outline some other advantages of connecting the debate to the wider causation literature, including how that yields us an account of the distinction between genetic traits and genetic dispositions.
Keywords genes  innateness  causal explanation  genetic trait  genetic disposition
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Causality.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Innate Mind Need Not Be Within.Riin Kõiv - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):101-121.
Conceived This Way: Innateness Defended.Northcott Robert - forthcoming - Philosophers Imprint.
Innate Mind Need Not Be Within.Riin Kõiv - 2020 - Acta Analytica (1):1-21.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Genetic Traits.Fred Gifford - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (3):327-347.
Explanation and Causation in Genetics.Frederick H. Gifford - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?Kevin C. Klement - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (4):383-400.
How Darwinian Reductionism Refutes Genetic Determinism.Philip M. Rosoff & Alex Rosenberg - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):122-135.
Dna, Inference, and Information.Ulrich E. Stegmann - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-17.
The Dispositional Genome: Primus Inter Pares.Christopher J. Austin - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (2):227-246.
Developmental Causation and the Problem of Homology.David A. Baum - 2013 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 5 (20150505).
Genetic Explanation in Psychology.Marko Barendregt - 2003 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):67-90.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-11-13

Total views
331 ( #26,707 of 2,445,561 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #32,190 of 2,445,561 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes