How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation

Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):589-605 (2006)
Abstract
Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features - we call this "epistemic-ontological inference." Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism
Keywords EMOTION EXPERIENCE   BRAIN   SELF
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080600901889
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,370
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Searle on Consciousness and Dualism.Corbin Collins - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
How Bad Is Rape?H. E. Baber - 1987 - Hypatia 2 (2):125-138.
The Hiddenness Argument Revisited.J. L. Schellenberg - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (3):287-303.
Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents.Peter J. Taylor - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304-310.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
123 ( #40,842 of 2,193,768 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,980 of 2,193,768 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature