Distributed in the U.S. By Palgrave (2002)
In this detailed study, Christopher Norris defends the kinds of arguments advanced by the early realist, Hilary Putnam. Norris makes a point of placing Putnam's work in a wider philosophical context, and relating it to various current debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. Much like Putnam, Norris is willing to take full account of opposed viewpoints while maintaining a vigorously argued commitment to the values of debate and enquiry.
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|Call number||B945.P874.N66 2002|
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Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation.Dale Jacquette - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):15-35.
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