Health Care Analysis 21 (4):298-305 (2013)

In this article I respond to Björn Hofmann’s criticism of some elements in my theory of health. Hofmann’s main objective is to question “Nordenfelt’s basic premise that you can be ill without having negative first-person experiences, and to investigate the consequences of abandoning the premise.” One of Hofmann’s critical points is that my theory of health does not lend voice to the individual. My response is essentially conducted in four steps: (1) I question the aim of conceptual analysis that Hofmann proposes for the analysis of the notion of health. (2) I maintain that my analysis, in spite of Hofmann’s contention, lends voice to the individual. It does so via my notion of subjective illness but also via my notion of vital goal. (3) I argue that conditions, such as coma, paralysis and mania are salient instances of ill health and that these may become neglected if the use of the terms “ill” and “illness” is restricted to instances where negative subjective experiences are present. (4) I rehearse my main arguments for selecting disability as the core element of ill health and respond to Hofmann’s contention that persons who are in great pain can sometimes nevertheless perform perfectly
Keywords Illness  Ill health  Disability  Subjective experiences  Vital goals
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DOI 10.1007/s10728-013-0256-1
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Moral Theory and Medical Practice. [REVIEW]Grant Gillett - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (164):379.

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