David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):379-399 (1990)
Susan Mills and John Beatty's propensity interpretation of fitness encountered very different philosophical criticisms by Alexander Rosenberg and Kenneth Waters. These criticisms and the rejoinders to them are both predictable and important. They are predictable as raisingkinds of issues typically associated with disposition concepts (this is established through a systematic review of the problems generated by Carnap's dispositional interpretation of all scientific terms). They are important as referring the resolution of these issues to the development of evolutionary biology. This historical approach to the propensity interpretation of fitness draws attention to the precarious relation between philosophical clarification of scientific concepts and any given state of the empirical arts.
|Keywords||Fitness dispositions and propensities Carnap historiography of science history of the philosophy of science|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sandra D. Mitchell (1995). Function, Fitness and Disposition. Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):39-54.
Alfred Nordmann (1992). Darwinians at War Bateson's Place in Histories of Darwinism. Synthese 91 (1-2):53 - 72.
Alan C. Love (2005). The Return of the Embryo. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):567-584.
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