Persistent propensities: Portrait of a familiar controversy [Book Review]

Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):379-399 (1990)
Susan Mills and John Beatty's propensity interpretation of fitness encountered very different philosophical criticisms by Alexander Rosenberg and Kenneth Waters. These criticisms and the rejoinders to them are both predictable and important. They are predictable as raisingkinds of issues typically associated with disposition concepts (this is established through a systematic review of the problems generated by Carnap's dispositional interpretation of all scientific terms). They are important as referring the resolution of these issues to the development of evolutionary biology. This historical approach to the propensity interpretation of fitness draws attention to the precarious relation between philosophical clarification of scientific concepts and any given state of the empirical arts.
Keywords Fitness  dispositions and propensities  Carnap  historiography of science  history of the philosophy of science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF02207378
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,463
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1995). The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Alan C. Love (2005). The Return of the Embryo. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):567-584.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

13 ( #333,221 of 1,925,541 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #308,489 of 1,925,541 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.