Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94 (2015)
AbstractI investigate whether degreed beliefs are able to play the predictive, explanatory, and modeling roles that they are frequently taken to play. The investigation focuses on evidence—both from sources familiar in epistemology as well as recent work in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology—of variability in agents' apparent degrees of belief. Although such variability has been noticed before, there has been little philosophical discussion of its breadth or of the psychological mechanisms underlying it. Once these are appreciated, the inadequacy of degrees of belief becomes clear. I offer a theoretical alternative to degrees of belief, what I call the filter theory
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.
Religious Beliefs Are Factual Beliefs: Content Does Not Correlate with Context Sensitivity.Neil Levy - 2017 - Cognition 161:109-116.
Similar books and articles
Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1027-44.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
On the Very Idea of Degrees of Truth.Timothy Cleveland - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):218 – 221.
Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F P Ramsey.Frank Plumpton Ramsey & D. H. Mellor (eds.) - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
Bayesian Epistemology.Alan Hájek & Stephan Hartmann - 2010 - In DancyJ (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.
Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 491--506.
Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 37-47.