Uncertainty Without All the Doubt

Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94 (2015)
Authors
Aaron Norby
Yale University
Abstract
I investigate whether degreed beliefs are able to play the predictive, explanatory, and modeling roles that they are frequently taken to play. The investigation focuses on evidence—both from sources familiar in epistemology as well as recent work in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology—of variability in agents' apparent degrees of belief. Although such variability has been noticed before, there has been little philosophical discussion of its breadth or of the psychological mechanisms underlying it. Once these are appreciated, the inadequacy of degrees of belief becomes clear. I offer a theoretical alternative to degrees of belief, what I call the filter theory
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12072
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.

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Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.

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