What kind of neural coding and self does Hurley's shared circuit model presuppose?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):33-34 (2008)

Georg Northoff
University of Ottawa
Susan Hurley's impressive article about the shared circuit model (SCM) raises two important issues. First, I suggest that the SCM presupposes relational coding rather than translational coding as neural code. Second, the SCM being the basis for self implies that the self may be characterized as format, relational, and embodied and embedded, rather than by specific and isolated higher-order cognitive contents
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X07003251
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Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
An Embodied Cognitive Science?Andy Clark - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):345-351.
Event Files: Feature Binding in and Across Perception and Action.Bernhard Hommel - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):494-500.

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