Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124 (2007)
In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments offered in favor of the ‘conceptual impossibility’ of performing such actions fail without exception. If we are to argue against doxastic voluntarism we are better off by resorting to more modest means.
|Keywords||Doxastic voluntarism Genetic version Conceptual impossibility Epistemic deontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
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