The concept of chaos in contemporary science: On Jean Bricmont's critique of Ilya Prigogine's ideas [Book Review]

Foundations of Science 7 (4):465-479 (2002)
Nonclarity around the understandingof the concept of chaos has caused someconfusion in the contemporary natural science.For instance, not making a clear distinctionbetween the deterministic and quantum chaos hasmade it impossible to evaluate the approach ofIlya Prigogine in an appropriate way. It isshown that Jean Bricmont has missed the targetin his critique of I. Prigogine's ideas, as thelatter has concentrated his interest on systemsconsisting of infinite (arbitrarily large)number of particles in incessant mutualimpact, the former on systems that have afinite (not necessarily large, althoughsometimes very large) number of particles,which move freely of any mutual impact orparticipate only in transient interaction. Thedifference may sometimes be quite crucial. Itis also suggested that if we consider theirreversibility as the basic element ofdescription of physical world, the world oftrajectories and wave functions cannot beresearched apart from this real irreversibility.
Keywords deterministic chaos  quantum chaos  indeterminism  irreversibility  initial conditions  large Poincaré systems  thermodynamic limit
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1020729714449
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,781
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Philosophy of Science in Estonia.Rein Vihalemm & Peeter Müürsepp - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):167-191.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
22 ( #235,371 of 2,199,425 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #299,438 of 2,199,425 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature