Biosemiotics 3 (1):79-92 (2010)

This paper focuses on the disparate phenomena we psychologize as “selfhood”. A central argument is that, far from being a deus ex machina as required in the Cartesian schema, our felt experience of self is above all a consequence of data compression. In coming to this conclusion, it considers in turn the Cartesian epiphany, other traditional and contemporary perspectives, and a half-century’s empirical work in the Freeman lab on neurodynamics. We introduce the concept of consciousness qua process as a force.
Keywords Subjectivity  Dissociation  Neural dynamics  Microgestures  Dualism  Embodiment
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12304-009-9070-4
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,178
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Episodic Buffer: A New Component of Working Memory?Alan Baddeley - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (11):417-423.
Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?Alva Noë & Evan Thompson - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity.Ted Honderich - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
Comparative Studies Provide Evidence for Neural Reuse.Paul S. Katz - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):278-279.
Organizing the Brain's Diversities.Michael A. Arbib & Peter Érdi - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):551-565.
Descartes, Spacetime, and Relational Motion.Edward Slowik - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (1):117-139.


Added to PP index

Total views
18 ( #590,442 of 2,454,932 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,233 of 2,454,932 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes