Sosa's Moore and the new dogmatists

Metaphilosophy 40 (2):180-186 (2009)
Abstract: Some seventy years ago, G. E. Moore invoked his own sensory experience (as of a hand before him in the right circumstances), added some philosophical analysis about externality, and took himself to have offered his "Proof" of the existence of an external world. Current neo-Mooreans either reject completely the standard negative assessment of the Proof or qualify it substantially. For Sosa, the Proof can be persuasive, but only when read literally as offering reasons for the conclusion that there is at least one external object—rather than that the prover is justified in believing, or even knowing, that there is at least one external object. Sosa, then, is a neo-Moorean—though not of the sort we might expect in light of the ongoing debate about the Proof. I argue that Sosa needs to say more about the circularity often thought to vitiate the Proof before we can accept his view.
Keywords Moore's Proof  begging the question  neo‐Mooreanism  transmission of warrant  idealism  skepticism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01576.x
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References found in this work BETA
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.

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