Abstract

Leibniz can be counted among the remote, but still significant, sources of Sellars's philosophy. Such thesis, however, is meaningless unless its conceptual relevance is displayed. Therefore, it will be immediately added that Sellars's relation with Leibniz is focused on three main fundamental issues, which respectively concern (1) the concept of nature, (2) the concept of truth and (3) the concept itself of nominalism. Besides, there are other seemingly minor topics, which actually refers to the definition of abstract entities, of predicates, of proper names and to the datum/factum distinction. Another challenge the paper is faced with, regards the fact that Sellars does not consider Leibniz only in himself, given that he very often positions him in a close relation to Kant: it is as though there were multifaceted issues brought forward by Leibniz and Kant together forming a complex theoretical unity (over and above their differences). According to Sellars, in fact, they both undermine some of the most solid epistemological principles of the early modern times (mainly founded upon the subject- object lexicon and the idea of veritas as adaequatio rei et intellectus) and they both reshape the meaning of expressions such as “being actual” or “being true”.