Argumentation 16 (1):111-133 (2002)

Legal argumentation, like argumentation generally, occurs against a background of shared understanding and competence. This view, inspired by Kuhn's understanding of scientific reasoning, is in stark contrast to more traditional ‘rule-following’ accounts of legal argumentation. Below I consider reasons to reject the more traditional view of legal reasoning in favor of a roughly Kuhnian account of legal reasoning and conclude by raising skeptical questions about the cogency of legal reasoning when the tacitly accepted background conditions that make it possible are not critically examined
Keywords Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas  Bush v. Gore  legal argumentation  paradigm  precedent  rule following
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DOI 10.1023/A:1014952008795
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Law, Logic, Rhetoric: A Procedural Model of Legal Argumentation.Arno R. Lodder - 2004 - In S. Rahman (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 569--588.
Validating Extremism.Carol Winkler, Kareem el-Damanhoury & Anthony F. Lemieux - 2018 - Journal of Argumentation in Context 7 (1):33-71.

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