Tugba Yoldas
University of Alberta
Howard Leo Nye
University of Alberta
In this paper, we defend three claims about what it will take for an AI system to be a basic moral patient to whom we can owe duties of non-maleficence not to harm her and duties of beneficence to benefit her: (1) Moral patients are mental patients; (2) Mental patients are true intentional systems; and (3) True intentional systems are systematically flexible. We suggest that we should be particularly alert to the possibility of such systematically flexible true intentional systems developing in the areas of exploratory robots and artificial personal assistants. Finally, we argue that in light of our failure to respect the well-being of existing biological moral patients and worries about our limited resources, there are compelling moral reasons to treat artificial moral patiency as something to be avoided at least for now.
Keywords Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, Moral Patients, Well-Being, Machine Ethics, Moral Status of Artificial Systems, Consciousness and Intentionality, Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality, Representationalism About Consciousness, Success Semantics
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Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
Real Patterns.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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