Dissertation, University of Michigan (2009)

Authors
Howard Leo Nye
University of Alberta
Abstract
I present and defend (1) an account of ethical judgments as judgments about our reasons to feel specific motivationally laden attitudes, (2) an account of what an agent should do in terms of what would achieve ends that she has reason to be motivated to pursue, and (3) an account of an agent’s reasons for motivation (and thus action) in terms of the prescriptions of the most fundamental principles that guide her deliberations. Using these accounts, I explain the connection between ethics and reasons for action, how ethical judgments are both descriptive and intrinsically motivating, and how ethical facts arise from facts about agents’ deliberations.
Keywords metaethics  moral psychology  practical reason  moral rationalism  fitting attitude analyses  buck-passing  moral rationalism  existence internalism  metanormative descriptivism  metanormative realism
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA

Non-Consequentialism Demystified.Howard Nye, David Plunkett & John Ku - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (4):1-28.
The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.

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