Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):264-285 (2021)

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Abstract
According to linguistic conventionalism, necessities are to be explained in terms of the conventionally adopted rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions. A number of influential arguments against this view concerns the ‘Truth-Contrast Thesis’. This is the claim that necessary truths are fundamentally different from contingent ones since they are not made true by ‘the facts’. Instead, they are supposed to be something like ‘true in virtue of meaning’. This thesis is widely held to be a core commitment of the conventionalist position, and the view is frequently rejected on the grounds that this thesis is untenable. I argue that this line of reasoning is mistaken. While the thesis should be rejected, it is not, I argue, entailed by linguistic conventionalism – nor was it invariably accepted by the paradigmatic conventionalists.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqaa036
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.

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