Synonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian’s model

Analysis 77 (3):559-565 (2017)

Abstract
According to Paul Boghossian, some truths are knowable a priori because they are expressed by epistemically analytic sentences. In such cases, understanding the sentence is meant to suffice for justified belief in the proposition it expresses. One alleged route from understanding to justification goes via what Boghossian calls ‘the synonymy model’. This article presents a dilemma for this model and argues that although a strategy for avoiding the dilemma is available, this does not vindicate Boghossian's model.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx114
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Frege's Puzzle.Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
Analyticity Reconsidered.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].

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