American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (3):221 - 228 (1976)

Authors
Tim Oakley
La Trobe University
Abstract
This paper argues for a completely universal scepticism, according to which no beliefs at all are justified to the least degree. The argument starts with a version of the Agrippan trilemma, according to which, if we accept that a belief is justified, we must choose between foundationalism, coherentism of a particular sort, and an infinite regress of justified beliefs. Each of these theories is given a careful specification in terms of the relationship of “justifiedness in p depending on justifiedness in q”. It is then argued that no beliefs – not even beliefs about phenomenal experiences – are foundational in the required way. Both coherentism and infinitism are untenable, since, since they face various objections, most significantly the objection that acceptance of either would commit one to allowing that all beliefs were justified. Because the three possible accounts of justificational structure all fail radically, it is concluded that no beliefs are justified.
Keywords skepticism   justified belief  foundationalism  coherentism  Infinite regress of justification  epistemic regress  infinitism
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The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Coherentism Via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
The Legacy of Thompson Clarke.Roger Eichorn - 2020 - Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 23 (12):148-167.

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