In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. pp. 17 (2006)

Tim Oakley
La Trobe University
A person’s being justified in a belief will sometimes depend on her being justified in some other belief. I argue that this concept of epistemic dependence is required for setting up the debate between epistemological foundationalism and its alternatives. I also argue that the concept is deeply problematic, in that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give a coherent account of it. Several possible analyses of epistemic dependence are presented and found wanting, and attention is given to different types of justifiedness. I conclude that the debate between foundationalists, coherentists and others is in need of a new conceptual framework.
Keywords epistemic dependence  justification  regress of reasons  foundationalism  coherentism
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