Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349 (2006)
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Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism, allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism of the Consequence Argument fails



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Jeffrey Shane Oakley
University of North Carolina at Wilmington

References found in this work

Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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