Interpretations of intuitionist logic in non-normal modal logics

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):47-60 (1999)
Historically, it was the interpretations of intuitionist logic in the modal logic S4 that inspired the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic. The inspiration of this paper is the interpretation of intuitionist logic in the non-normal modal logic S3: an S3 model structure can be 'looked at' as an intuitionist model structure and the semantics for S3 can be 'cashed in' to obtain a non-normal semantics for intuitionist propositional logic. This non-normal semantics is then extended to intuitionist quantificational logic
Keywords logic  intuitionist logic  modal logic  semantics  model(s)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1004324522424
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Kurt Gödel (1986). Collected Works. Oxford University Press.
Ian Hacking (1963). What is Strict Implication? Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (1):51-71.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

34 ( #141,423 of 1,924,986 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #187,164 of 1,924,986 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.