Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84 (2009)

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Abstract
According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic – the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining the end-point of cognitive development; and contemporary psychology of reasoning has focussed on comparing human reasoning against logical standards
Keywords Bayes' theorem   conditional inference   logic   non-monotonic reasoning   probability   rational analysis   rationality   reasoning   selection task   syllogisms
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000284
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle - 1999 - Courier Dover Publications.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.

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New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.

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