From Skepticism to Paralysis: The Apraxia Argument in Cicero’s Academica

Ancient Philosophy 32 (2):369-392 (2012)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the apraxia argument in Cicero’s Academica. It proposes that the argument assumes two modes: the evidential mode maintains that skepticism is false, while the pragmatic claims that it is disadvantageous. The paper then develops a tension between the two modes, and concludes by exploring some differences between ancient and contemporary skepticism.

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References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.

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Citations of this work

Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité.Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - In Diego E. Machuca & Stéphane Marchand (eds.), Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique. Paris: Classiques Garnier. pp. 53-87.
De Praktische En Epistemische Waarde van Het Pyrronisme.Diego Machuca - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):73-98.
Ancient Skepticism.Leo Groarke - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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