What's wrong with infringements (insofar as infringements are not wrong): A reply [Book Review]

Law and Philosophy 27 (3):293 - 307 (2008)
An earlier article of mine, 'Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights', was devoted to rebutting Judith Jarvis Thomson's arguments in favor of incorporating the distinction between (permissibly) infringing and (impermissibly) violating a right. In 'A Defence of Infringement', Andrew Botterell maintains that my criticisms and attempted rebuttals of Thomson's position fail, and that despite my efforts to show otherwise, the category of right infringements is secure. In this reply, I explain why I demur.
Keywords Law   Logic   Political Science   Social Sciences, general   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10982-007-9019-1
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