David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Law and Philosophy 27 (3):293 - 307 (2008)
An earlier article of mine, 'Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights', was devoted to rebutting Judith Jarvis Thomson's arguments in favor of incorporating the distinction between (permissibly) infringing and (impermissibly) violating a right. In 'A Defence of Infringement', Andrew Botterell maintains that my criticisms and attempted rebuttals of Thomson's position fail, and that despite my efforts to show otherwise, the category of right infringements is secure. In this reply, I explain why I demur.
|Keywords||Law Logic Political Science Social Sciences, general Philosophy of Law Law Theory/Law Philosophy|
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Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Explaining Compensatory Duties. Legal Theory 16 (2):91-110.
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