Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86 (1997)
When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between a counter-intuitive theory or no theory at all. We offer a way out of this dilemma. We argue that the computational theory of mind doesn't force cognitive scientists to explain consciousness in terms of computational processes, as there is an alternative strategy available: one that focuses on the representational vehicles that encode information in the brain. This alternative approach to consciousness allows us to do justice to the standard intuitions about phenomenal experience, yet remain within the confines of cognitive science
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Consciousness Mind Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Reduction and the Determination of Phenomenal Character.Jennifer Matey - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.
Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
Similar books and articles
Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.Alvin Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness.Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Todd A. Grantham - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):648-670.
Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Could Phenomenal Consciousness Function as a Cognitive Unconscious?Max Velmans - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):357-358.
A Defense of Cartesian Materialism.Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939 - 963.
Connectionist Vehicles, Structural Resemblance, and the Phenomenal Mind.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):13-38.
A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads86 ( #57,417 of 2,143,787 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #280,512 of 2,143,787 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.